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SITUATIONAL DURESS AND THE ABERRANCE OF ELECTRONIC 
CONTRACTS
NANCY S. KIM*
INTRODUCTION
The theme of this symposium issue is aberrant contracts and this arti-
cle considers a particularly virulent strain of aberrant contract—the mass 
consumer electronic contract. In the past decade, electronic contracts have 
spread dramatically and are now ubiquitous on the Internet and handheld 
devices. They have migrated offline so that paper contracts, notices and 
even invoices incorporate, by reference, electronic terms.1 Electronic con-
tracts are aberrant in a variety of ways, including their form, their medium, 
and their content. The intangibility and flexibility of electronic contracts 
make it easier for drafting companies to deploy them, but they also make it 
easier for consumers to ignore them. Companies exploit the form and ex-
cessively use electronic contracts. The excessive use of these contracts 
affects the consumer in several ways. First, it fosters confusion because the 
consumer receives contracts through a variety of channels and may be con-
fused as to which terms or versions actually apply to a particular transac-
tion. Frequent modifications to electronic terms exacerbate this problem.2
In addition, excessive use of electronic contracts encourages consumer 
habituation. Companies intentionally minimize the disruptiveness of con-
tract presentment in order to facilitate transactions and to create a smooth 
website experience for the consumer. All of this reduces the signaling ef-
fect of contracts and deters consumers from reading terms. Often, they fail 
to realize that by clicking “accept” they are entering into a legal commit-
* Professor, California Western School of Law. This article is part of the symposium on aberrant con-
tracts, which resulted from the 2013 AALS Annual Meeting of the Commercial and Consumer Law 
Section. The author thanks Professor Sarah Howard Jenkins for organizing the symposium and for 
welcoming this contribution and Devon J. Steinmeyer and The Chicago-Kent Law Review for their 
diligent assistance.
1. See Vernon v. Qwest Communications Int’l Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1150 (D. Colo. 2012) 
(where letter sent to Qwest customers incorporated by reference an online agreement); Briceño v. Sprint 
Spectrum, L.P., 911 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (invoice sent to plaintiff incorporated by 
reference online terms). But see Manasher v. NECC Telecom, 2007 WL 2713845 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 8, 
2007) (website terms of use incorporated in paper invoice were not incorporated by reference).
2. See Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps and Browse-
wraps: How the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to the Law of the Horse, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 23 
(2011-2012) (noting that unilateral modifications are common provisions in online agreements).
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ment. Companies take advantage of consumer failure to read and include 
ever more aggressive and oppressive terms. Meanwhile, courts apply doc-
trinal rules without considering the impact of the electronic form on the 
behavior of the parties.
This article explains how the aberrant nature of electronic contracts 
has unique effects. Companies take advantage of these unique effects and 
use electronic contracts in a coercive manner. This article proposes the new 
defense of “situational duress” to address the exploitative use of electronic 
contracts in certain situations. As with traditional duress, in order to avoid a 
contract on the grounds of situational duress, a consumer would have to 
prove that the drafting company made an improper threat that left the con-
sumer with no reasonable alternative.3 Unlike traditional duress, a finding 
of situational duress would render a contract void and not merely voidable.
The meaning and application of the rule would be tailored in a way that 
recognizes the coercive nature of introducing an electronic contract in cer-
tain situations.
Part I explains why electronic contracts are aberrant and explains how 
the developing law in this area deviates from traditional contract doctrine. 
This section also discusses how the electronic form affects consumer be-
havior and understanding of contract terms. Part II provides background to 
the traditional doctrine of duress and introduces the concept of situational 
duress. Part III explains how the defense of situational duress would oper-
ate and how it would respond to, and rectify problems associated with, 
electronic contracts. Part III also addresses anticipated objections to such a 
defense.
This article concludes that the aberrance of electronic contracts as a 
contracting form requires recognition in the definition and application of 
doctrinal rules. The digital form of electronic contracts obscures consumer 
perception and facilitates exploitation by companies. The proposed defense 
of situational duress enhances fairness in the contracting process by con-
sidering and responding to the effect of electronic contracts on the behavior 
of the parties in two specific situations: the “rolling contract” scenario and 
the “content hostage” scenario.4
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS, § 175(1) (“If a party’s manifestation of assent is 
induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the 
contract is voidable by the victim.”).
4. See infra Part III.A.
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I. WHY ELECTRONIC CONTRACTS ARE ABERRANT CONTRACTS
Mass consumer electronic contracts, also known as clickwraps, 
browsewraps and tapwraps, differ from the archetype of a negotiated paper 
contract;5 however, they are not so different from other contracts of adhe-
sion.6 Like their paper-based, real world counterparts, they contain one-
sided provisions, companies offer them on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and 
consumers fail to read their terms.7
Nonetheless, electronic contracts differ from their real world counter-
part in two important ways. The first is the way that courts have applied the 
law to them. The second is their essence. This section addresses each as-
pect in turn.8
A. A Brief Overview of Electronic Contract Doctrine
In determining whether an electronic contract has been validly 
formed, courts must find that there was both “reasonable notice” of terms 
and “manifestation of assent” by the consumer.9 Manifestation of assent 
can be an affirmative act, such as clicking on an “I accept” icon with a 
computer mouse, but it may also be a failure to actively reject after receipt 
of notice, such as with browsewraps.10
5. See NANCY KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 4 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2013). Clickwraps require that users click with a computer mouse on an “accept” icon, browse-
wraps are hyperlinks, which require clicking to view terms, and tapwraps require users to tap on an 
“accept” icon. Id.
6. Numerous scholars have written about the issues associated with contracts of adhesion. See, 
e.g., Arthur A. Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970); Russell Korobkin, Bounded 
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003); Todd 
D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983); W. 
David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 529 (1971).
7. For a discussion of the ways in which form contracts wrest important rights from consumers, 
see generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE 
RULE OF LAW (2013).
8. For a complete discussion and analysis of the differences between digital and paper contracts, 
see KIM, supra note 5.
9. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F. 3d 17, 28 (2002) (noting that both 
“conspicuous notice” of the existence of the contract and unambiguous “manifestation of assent” are 
essential to electronic bargains). Id. at 35. The courts seem to use the terms “assent” and “consent”
interchangeably. See id. at 29 (noting that in California, a party’s intent to contract is judged by the 
party’s outward “manifestation of consent”).
10. By comparison, traditional contract law holds that silence does not constitute acceptance 
unless the offeree intends it. See ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, ONE VOLUME 
EDITION 119 (1952) (“It should here be plainly set forth that an offeror has no power to cause the 
silence of the offeree to operate as an acceptance when the offeree does not intend it to do so.”).
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Notice can be actual or constructive.11 Traditionally, courts have held 
that clauses printed on the reverse side of a document do not bind a person 
unless they were called to that person’s attention.12 Yet, in electronic con-
tract cases, courts generally find notice where the consumer must click on 
an icon in order to complete the transaction, and the icon indicates that 
legal terms apply to the transaction. This is true even if the terms them-
selves were not immediately visible but were, instead, contained in a hyper-
link near the “accept” icon or contained in a scrollable box.13 If the 
consumer is not required to click in order to proceed, a court will still find 
notice if the consumer receives a cease and desist letter or if the terms are 
visible on the website without scrolling down.14 In the case of a cease and 
desist letter, the language from court decisions seems to indicate that notice 
is effective at the time actual notice is received and not as of the time of the 
initial interaction.15
For example, in Southwest Airlines v. BoardFirst, LLC, BoardFirst ac-
cessed Southwest Airlines’ website in order to check in passengers early, 
thereby obtaining a preferential boarding position.16 On Southwest Air-
lines’ homepage, in “small black print at the bottom of the page,” were 
words indicating that “[u]se of the Southwest websites . . . constitutes ac-
ceptance of our Terms and Conditions.”17 The “Terms and Conditions” 
were hyperlinked to the actual terms and conditions page and limited the 
use of the website to “personal, non-commercial purposes.”18 Southwest 
Airlines later added language that “third parties may not use the Southwest 
11. Southwest Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., Civil Action No.3: 06-CV-0891-B, 2007 WL 
4823761, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007); Cairo, Inc. v. CrossMedia Servs., Inc., No. C 04-04825 JW, 
2005 WL 756610, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005).
12. Birmingham Television Corp. v. Water Works, 290 So. 2d 636, 642 (Ala. 1974); In re Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. La Perta, 42 A.D.2d 104, 108 (N.Y. 1973); Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 97 A.2d 234, 238 (Pa. 
1953); see also John D. Calamari, Duty to Read—A Changing Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 341, 344 
(1974).
13. See Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 237 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding that as long as 
there was notice that terms were contained in a particular location, requiring users to scroll in order to 
view them was permissible).
14. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004); BoardFirst, L.L.C, 2007
WL 4823761, at *4.
15. See BoardFirst, L.L.C, 2007 WL 4823761, at *5. The court found the notice requirements 
were met because the “evidence shows that BoardFirst has had knowledge of the Terms as early as”
when it received Southwest’s cease and desist letter in which it was informed of the violation. Id.; see 
also Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d at 403; Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., No. 3:10–CV–957 JCH, 2011 WL 
797505, at *5 (D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2011).
16. 2007 WL 4823761, at *1.
17. Id. at *2 (alterations in original).
18. Id.
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web sites for the purpose of checking Customers in online or attempting to 
obtain for them a boarding pass in any certain boarding group.”19
The court found the notice requirements were met because BoardFirst 
“had knowledge of the Terms as early as” when it received Southwest’s 
cease and desist letter informing BoardFirst of the violation.20 In other 
words, the court did not determine that BoardFirst had notice, actual or 
constructive, at the time it first visited Southwest’s website; rather, it found 
notice because BoardFirst continued to violate the Terms after having re-
ceived actual notice by mail.
In the past, courts accommodated changes in contracting form by ex-
amining whether there was in fact an apparent manifestation of assent to 
the document.21 The document must be legible and the terms sufficiently 
called to the attention of the party signing it.22 Under the “reasonable 
communicativeness” test, courts focus both on the physical characteristics 
of the notice and extrinsic factors, such as the recipient’s ability to become 
meaningfully informed of the contractual terms.23 For example, in Wallis v. 
Princess Cruises, Inc.,24 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed 
whether the limitation of liability provision on the back of a passenger’s 
ticket was reasonably communicated to the passenger and concluded that it 
was not.25 Although the courts found that the physical characteristics of the 
terms were “sufficiently conspicuous”26 the relevant limitation of liability 
did not apply because it was difficult for the “average passenger with no 
legal background” to fully understand it the way that it was written.27
By contrast, with electronic contracts, courts typically fail to 
acknowledge the difference that digital form has on both consumer percep-
tion and businesses’ drafting behavior.28 Courts declare that electronic 
contracts are “just like” paper contracts and emphasize their similarities 
without also acknowledging their differences. For example, in Regis-
ter.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., the Second Circuit stated that while Internet 
19. Id.
20. Id. at *4.
21. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 393 (5th ed. 2003).
22. Id. at 393-394.
23. Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1307, 
1314 (2005) (Courts have “fashioned tests such as the ‘reasonable communicativeness’ test, under 
which the combination of reasonable notice of the contractual nature of offered terms and the oppor-
tunity to review those terms serves as a proxy for the offeree’s clear manifestation of assent.”).
24. 306 F.3d 827, 840 (9th Cir. 2002).
25. Id. at 830.
26. Id. at 836.
27. Id. 836-838.
28. Moringiello, supra note 23, at 1320 (noting that courts tend to view electronic contracts as “no 
different” from paper contracts).
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commerce has “exposed courts to many new situations, it has not funda-
mentally changed the principles of contract.”29 Another court stated that 
hyperlinks, “should be treated the same as a multipage written paper con-
tract. The blue hyperlink simply takes a person to another page of the con-
tract, similar to turning the page of a written paper contract.”30 In another 
case, the court insisted that a person who “checks the box agreeing to the 
terms and conditions of a purchase on an internet site without scrolling 
down to read all of the terms and conditions is in the same position as a 
person who turns to the last page of a paper contract and signs it without 
reading the terms—namely the clause is still valid.”31 This view underes-
timates the impact of form on perception, and it also ignores the way exist-
ing law has been shaped by form.
B. The Essence of Electronic Contracts
The identifying characteristic—the essence—of clickwraps and 
browsewraps is that their terms are electronic. The nontangible, digital 
essence of electronic contracts has important consequences. Electronic 
terms are intangible and weightless, which affects consumer awareness. 
Contracts communicate with their words, but also through their form. A 
thick stack of documents signals something very different from a ticket 
stub with wording on one side. The length of a document, the quality of the 
paper, and its presentation all communicate something about the nature of 
the transaction. The heft of a document tends to correspond to the onerous-
ness of the obligations agreed to by the consumer. Those signaling effects 
are often lost with electronic contracts.
One might argue that even short documents can require consumers to 
relinquish significant rights. A one-page indemnification means that a con-
sumer has agreed to a potentially alarming obligation. A waiver on the back 
of a claim check ticket means that a consumer has given up an important 
avenue of redress. Yet those examples only emphasize the essential differ-
ence between paper and electronic contracts. Electronic contracts are not 
physically constrained in the same way as paper contracts of adhesion. 
Both a one-page indemnification and a claim check ticket are limited by 
their physical space. The wording must be selected with care, and the rights 
claimed and the obligations sought are constrained by the four corners of 
the paper or the ticket stub. The space is further confined by the need to use 
29. 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004); see Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Servs. Inc., No. C 04-04825 
JW, 2005 WL 756610, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005).
30. Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113, 121 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
31. Scherillo v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 2d 313, 322 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
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attention-catching bold font and capitalized letters in order to pass judicial 
scrutiny of conspicuousness. Consequently, consumers will likely notice 
capitalized terms on the back of a ticket stub, even if they are unable to 
change them. Furthermore, the tangibility of paper has a significant cost. 
Mass consumer paper contracts cost money to print and store. Changes in 
contract terms require additional paper, which may discourage companies 
from modifying their forms unnecessarily. Companies are hesitant to annoy 
customers by seeking a signature for every transaction so one-time transac-
tions are often completed without a writing. Similarly, companies may 
dispense with having customers sign amended agreements for trivial
changes.
The same limitations do not apply to electronic terms. Electronic 
terms are flexible and easily manipulated. They can be modified and con-
nected across multiple pages with hyperlinks. The weightlessness and ma-
nipulability of electronic terms affect company behavior. An increase in the 
volume of electronic terms does not create a corresponding increase in cost. 
The intangible, digital essence of electronic contracts and the attenuated 
version of consent which is applied to them make it much easier for busi-
nesses to impose one-sided terms upon consumers, including terms that are
rarely found in paper contracts of adhesion, such as provisions transferring 
or granting rights to creative works32 and extensive tracking and exploita-
tion of user information. It also makes it easier for companies to continu-
ously modify terms. Not surprisingly, electronic contracts commonly 
contain “modification at will” provisions.33 For example, Twitter’s terms 
of services state:
We may revise these Terms from time to time, the most current version 
will always be at twitter.com/tos. If the revision, in our sole discretion, is 
material we will notify you via an @Twitter update or e-mail to the 
email associated with your account. By continuing to access or use the 
Services after those revisions become effective, you agree to be bound 
by the revised Terms.34
32. See Preston & McCann, supra note 2, at 19-20 (conducting survey of eight service providers 
and finding common onerous provisions, including mandatory arbitration clauses and rights to user 
creative works).
33. See Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.google.com/intl/
en/policies/terms/ (“We may modify these terms or any additional terms that apply to a Service to, for 
example, reflect changes to the law or changes to our Services.”); Yahoo Terms of Service, YAHOO!
(Mar. 16, 2013), http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/terms/ (“Yahoo! provides the Yahoo! Ser-
vices (defined below) to you subject to the following Terms of Service (‘TOS’), which may be updated 
by us from time to time without notice to you . . . . By accessing and using the Yahoo! Services, you 
accept and agree to be bound by the terms and provision of the TOS”); see also Preston & McCann, 
supra note 2, at 23.
34. Terms of Service, TWITTER (JUN. 25, 2012), https://twitter.com/tos.
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While courts are split on whether these modification at will provisions 
are enforceable, some will enforce them if the user continues to use the site 
after notice of the modifications. 35 Because notice is constructive and in-
cludes posting changes to the site, the reality is that consumers often are 
unaware of the changes.
Companies take advantage of the flexibility of electronic contracts to 
minimize the risk of aborted transactions. Their placement is often strategi-
cally designed to provide constructive notice without actually making the 
terms easy to read or find. For example, a consumer is often not aware of a 
contract’s terms until getting to the end of a sign-up process or, in the case 
of a retailer, having selected an item and filled out payment and personal 
information. The clickbox is often used to indicate a hyperlink, so there is a 
disruption (and possible loss of data) if the user actually clicks on the link 
to read the terms. The benefits of using electronic contracts for companies 
are obvious. They are cost effective, easy to duplicate, manipulate and 
modify, and only negligibly disruptive to the transacting process.
Electronic contracts may benefit the businesses that use them, but they 
excessively burden the consumer. Because they are weightless and often 
invisible to the consumer, electronic contracts are used in even unimportant 
or minor transactions which in the offline world would not require a con-
tract. The weightlessness of electronic contracts means that the consumer 
often fails to notice them. Even when capitalized and in bold, terms can 
only be viewed behind a hyperlink if the hyperlink is clicked upon. The 
malleability of electronic contracts means that the burden is on the con-
sumer to track down terms and reconcile conflicting provisions, a difficult 
task when every online transaction is governed by one or more electronic 
contracts and when a single contract often contains several hyperlinks to 
different web pages.
Users manifest assent to a browsewrap simply by continuing to use the 
website after the judicially constructed notice. Arguably, assent to click-
wraps requires no more from the user and also escapes user detection. As 
several scholars have noted, even the affirmative act of clicking is typically 
reflexive rather than deliberate and may not be perceived the same way as 
signing a document with a pen.36 Consumers in wrap contract cases often 
35. See Vernon v. Qwest Communications Int’l, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1153-56 (D. Colo. 
2012) (upholding modification at will provision). But see Harris v. Blockbuster Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 
396, 399 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (striking down modification at will provision at illusory); In re Zappos.com, 
Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 893 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065 (D. Nev. 2012) (noting most feder-
al courts find such clauses illusory if the party retains the “unilateral, unrestricted” right to terminate 
and there is “no obligation to receive consent from, or even notify” the other party).
36. See Robert A. Hillman, Online Consumer Standard Form Contracting Practices: A Survey 
and Discussion of Legal Implications, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE “INFORMATION 
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suffer from “click amnesia,”37 and claim that they have no recollection of 
ever having seen a clickwrap, even though they would have been prevented 
from proceeding on a website if they had not clicked to accept the terms.38
The testimony from consumers is not surprising to anyone but judges, 
who probably have clicked on such agreements themselves without much 
thought or awareness. One study found users tended to automatically click 
“accept” to clickwraps that resembled end user license agreements. The 
researchers believed that users have become so habituated to clickwraps 
that they have been trained to manifest consent without reading them.39
Electronic contracts create a feedback loop, with customer consent be-
coming automatic as consumers become habituated to the ubiquity of elec-
tronic contracts. Because consumers fail to notice, companies modify and 
increase the number of terms further perpetuating consumer habituation. 
Consequently, electronic contracts are lengthier and their terms more ag-
gressive than their paper counterparts.
Paper contracts of adhesion typically served to limit a company’s risk 
by, for example, limiting its liability or disclaiming a warranty. Common 
clauses in electronic contracts, on the other hand, do more than limit risk. 
These clauses establish or expand the bargain itself. Thus, electronic con-
tracts typically contain provisions obtaining rights to collect customer data, 
share customer information, and obtain control over customer creative 
works.40 Given the constructed nature of consent with electronic contracts, 
ECONOMY” 283 (Jane K. Winn 2006) (noting that that users may not assign the “same significance to a 
mouse click as a signature on a paper form”); Moringiello, supra note 23, at 1331 (stating that “the 
assumption that a click serves all of the same purposes that a signature does is . . . flawed . . . . It is not 
yet clear . . . that a click provides that signal, and courts do not seem to even address the possibility that 
it does not”); Elizabeth Macdonald, Incorporation of Standard Terms in Website Contracting – Clicking 
‘I Agree’, 27 J. CONT. L. 198 (2011) (“Underlying questions of substance should determine whether 
clicking an ‘I agree’ button should be treated as equivalent to a signature. A ‘click button’ signature 
would lack the alerting function of a manuscript signature . . . . There are good reasons why the ‘click 
button’ action should not be adopted as a signature.”).
37. KIM, supra note 5, at 129.
38. See Vernon, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 1147-48 (class action plaintiffs testified that they did not recall 
clicking on agreement even though they would not have been permitted to proceed without doing so); 
Scherillo v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 2d 313, 321-22 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (Court rejected 
plaintiff argument as “not credible” that he had “no recollection of checking the box or reading the 
terms and conditions”).
39. See RAINER BÖHME & STEFAN KÖPSELL, 2010 ACM CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN 
COMPUTING SYS., TRAINED TO ACCEPT? A FIELD EXPERIMENT ON CONSENT DIALOGS (2010).
40. See, e.g., LinkedIn User Agreement ¶2.2, LINKEDIN (Sept. 12, 2013), 
http://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement (“[Y]ou grant LinkedIn a nonexclusive, irrevocable, 
worldwide, perpetual, unlimited, assignable, sublicenseable, fully paid up and royalty-free right to us to 
copy, prepare derivative works of, improve, distribute, publish, remove, retain, add, process, analyze, 
use and commercialize, in any way now known or in the future discovered, any information you pro-
vide, directly or indirectly to LinkedIn, including, but not limited to, any user generated content, ideas, 
concepts, techniques and/or data to the services, you submit to LinkedIn, without any further consent, 
notice and/or compensation to you or to any third parties.”).
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obtaining these benefits differs from a traditional bargained-for exchange. 
Even with a paper contract of adhesion, consumers typically understand the 
nature of the bargain, even if they are unable to change the terms under 
which the bargain is made. Online, however, consumers are often ignorant 
that any bargain has taken place, believing, for example, that companies are 
acting as custodians of their content rather than as proprietors of it. The 
bargain itself is a moving target, thanks to “modification at will” provi-
sions.
C. The Folly of a Duty to Read Electronic Contracts
Prior to the introduction of mass-market software and other electronic 
items, consumers generally signed contracts. Even if they were powerless 
to negotiate terms, consumers could hardly argue that they were unaware of 
what they were doing. In some situations, such as with receipt of a claim 
check ticket, consumers did not have to sign anything because the courts 
found an implied contract;41 however, these forms were binding as con-
tracts only if the recipient received notice that there were terms on the 
back.42 In contract law, reasonable notice triggers a duty to read.43 A rea-
sonably prudent offeree should read the terms of a contract to which he or 
she is agreeing.
Courts also require reasonable notice with electronic contracts, but 
they have interpreted it to mean “visible to one looking for it,” unlike with 
claim check tickets where the wording must be conspicuous. Furthermore, 
the conspicuousness requirements applied to physical documents make 
little sense when applied to electronic documents. If the consumer fails to 
41. Calamari, supra note 12, at 342 (noting that the duty to read applies even without a signature 
“if the acceptance of a document . . . implies assent to its terms”).
42. Id. (“[T]he acceptance of documents such as bills of lading, passenger tickets, insurance 
policies, bank books and warehouse receipts may give rise to contracts based upon the provisions 
contained therein.”). Calamari adds, however, “the cases are far from harmonious.” Id. at 342 n.9.
43. See Russell v. Harman Int’l Indus. Inc., No. 07-2212, 2013 WL 2237793, at *4 (D.D.C. May 
22, 2013) (noting that it is “well established that a person has a duty to read a contract before he signs 
it”); Biesecker v. Biesecker, 302 S.E.2d 826, 828-29 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (“A person signing a written 
instrument is under a duty to read it for his own protection, and ordinarily is charged with knowledge of 
its contents.”); Smith v. Price’s Creameries, 650 P.2d 825, 829 (N.M. 1982) (noting that each party “has 
a duty to read and familiarize himself” with contents of contract before signing and thus, “a party who 
executes and enters into a written contract with another is presumed to know the terms of the agree-
ment, and to have agreed to each of its provisions in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation or other 
wrongful act”); see also Calamari, supra note 12, at (“[A] party who signs an instrument manifests 
assent to it and may not later complain that he did not read the instrument or that he did not understand 
its contents”). As Charles Knapp notes, the “the ‘duty to read,’ although regarded as a part of contract 
law, is not a ‘duty’ imposed by contract, but rather a statement about how parties should behave during 
the contract-making process.” Charles L. Knapp, Is There a Duty to Read?, in REVISITING THE 
CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY: ON THE EMPIRICAL AND THE LYRICAL 316 (Jean 
Braucher et al. eds., 2013).
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click a hyperlink or scroll to the bottom of a contract, the consumer will not 
notice bold font and capitalization. Even if the consumer were to click, the 
sheer volume of the terms she would encounter would make reading all of 
them unduly burdensome and highly impracticable. But in this judicially 
constructed alternative universe—where a reasonable person is presumed 
to notice terms that are buried in hyperlinks—the courts apply the duty to 
read. The result is that consumers are being bound to contracts without 
having read them or, in many cases, even being aware of them at all.
Courts recognized electronic forms as contracts but they failed to rec-
ognize the effect that these electronic forms have on consumer perception 
and drafting company behavior. The development of an aberrant doctrine 
contributed to further aberrance in both the form and the content of elec-
tronic agreements. Clickwraps and browsewraps have given birth to multi-
wraps where users are made to “click” to manifest assent to the terms of a 
hyperlinked document,44 which contains several more hyperlinked agree-
ments, thereby luring users into “agreeing” to terms without even seeing 
them. Electronic contracts are no longer limited to computer screens; they 
have spread to handheld devices where the smaller screen size may further 
obscure their presentation.
Electronic contracts have also migrated offline. Paper contracts of ad-
hesion often contain references to electronic contracts, which are incorpo-
rated by reference. Courts have enforced these agreements, even though 
consumers never received the actual terms, provided that they had con-
structive notice of their existence. In Vernon v. Qwest Communications 
International, Inc., the court found that a welcome letter to Qwest custom-
ers provided notice of a Subscriber Agreement that could be found 
online.45 In another case, Briceno v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P.,46 a consumer 
was deemed to have notice of online terms via a mailed invoice.47 By sepa-
rating the notice in one medium and the actual terms in another, the drafter 
forces the consumer, who is engaged in the offline activity of opening mail, 
to interrupt that activity, find a computer, and go online in order to read the 
terms. Electronic contracts are truly aberrant—no other type of contract is 
44. See DeJohn v. The .TV Corp. Int’l, 245 F. Supp. 2d 913, 915-916, 919 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (plain-
tiff clicked box to indicate acceptance to terms visible only by clicking on hyperlink); Swift v. Zynga 
Game Network, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 904, at 907-908 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (plaintiff clicked to indicate 
agreement to terms contained behind hyperlink).
45. See 857 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1150 (D. Colo. 2012) (“Qwest customers were made aware of the 
Subscriber Agreement through multiple communications. The December 2005 letter sent to existing 
Qwest customers explained that high speed internet services would henceforth be governed by a Sub-
scriber Agreement that could be found at www.qwest.com/legal.”).
46. 911 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
47. Id. at 178-79.
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considered binding upon an offeree who has not received the actual terms. 
Indeed, courts have permitted the use of electronic contracts to burden con-
sumers who are forced to hunt for terms through a disruptive process of 
toggling from one page to another via hyperlinks, or from one medium to 
another via paper notices that incorporate, by reference, electronic agree-
ments. The aberrant doctrine of electronic contract law imposes a duty to 
read yet ignores both the disruptive process required to find the terms and 
the sheer volume of terms applicable to a transaction.48
As they have done in the past with the advent of new contracting 
methods, courts have taken liberties with traditional contract law notions of 
offer, acceptance, and mutual assent in order to enforce electronic con-
tracts.49 In doing so, courts were adapting contract law to modern business 
needs—something that should be applauded. Unlike in the past, however, 
they refused to recognize how these forms burden consumers while benefit-
ting businesses.
Courts repackaged assent, swapping it out for notice. In doing so, they
made it much more difficult for consumers to decline agreements and much 
easier to be deemed to have accepted them. Companies exploited electronic 
agreements and they quickly became the norm in the online environment. 
Today, a consumer is practically unable to engage in any online activity 
without being forced to accept the terms of an electronic contract.50
II. DURESS AS A CONTRACT DEFENSE
Duress is defined as any wrongful act or threat, which overcomes the 
free will of a party.51 The legitimacy of contract law itself is based upon 
free will.52 Physical force provides a basis for duress, but the law of duress 
48. James Gibson notes the high information costs associated with adhesive contracts especially 
when considering all the multiple layers of contracts encountered for a single transaction. See James 
Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 161, 163-64 (2013). Furthermore, the “average 
computer purchase binds the consumer to twenty-five contracts, comprising 74,897 words of boiler-
plate.” Id. at 190.
49. Moringiello, supra note 23, at 1309 (noting that contract law has been modified over the years 
to “accommodate diverse methods of communicating those terms”).
50. Elsewhere, I have argued that the ubiquity of digital contracts online creates a coercive con-
tracting environment, which should be considered in evaluating a claim of unconscionability. See KIM,
supra note 5, at 4, 207.
51. PERILLO, supra note 21, at 316 (“Today the general rule is that any wrongful act or threat 
which overcomes the free will of a party constitutes duress.”); see also Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 
381, 386 (7th Cir. 2000) (Illinois defines duress as “a condition where one is induced by a wrongful act 
or threat of another to make a contract under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of his 
free will.”); Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533, 535 (N.Y. 1971).
52. Oswald v. City of El Centro. L.A., 292 P. 1073, 1076 (Cal. 1930) (The “exercise of freedom 
of will . . . is always essential to a valid contract.”).
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has evolved to include economic duress as well.53 Duress in the form of 
physical compulsion renders a contract void for lack of assent,54 but eco-
nomic duress renders it voidable.55 Courts typically evaluate duress claims 
by focusing on whether the party was the victim of a wrongful act or threat 
that deprived her of her free will.56 Alternatively, courts determine whether 
the following three elements exist: (1) the victim involuntarily accepted the 
terms of contract; (2) under circumstances that permitted no reasonable 
alternative; and (3) the other party’s improper actions created the circum-
stances.57
Thus, in evaluating whether duress compels a victim to enter into a 
contract, courts consider surrounding circumstances, including the back-
ground and relationship of the parties and the emotional state of the vic-
tim.58 The victim, however, needs to show more than hard bargaining or 
tough financial circumstances; she must show that the other party coerced, 
threatened or otherwise created the difficult circumstances, which caused 
her to enter into the contract.59 The doctrine of economic duress evolved 
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175-176 (1981) (An improper threat is one 
where “the resulting exchange is not on fair terms” and “would not significantly benefit the party 
making the threat”); see also Blodgett v. Blodgett, 551 N.E.2d 1249, 1251-1252 (Ohio 1990).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 (1981) (“If conduct . . . is physically com-
pelled by duress, the conduct is not effective as a manifestation of assent.”) Furthermore, comment a 
notes that the result is “there is no contract at all, or a ‘void contract’ as distinguished from a voidable 
one.” Id. at cmt. a.
55. Id. at § 175.
56. See Vasapolli v. Rostoff, 39 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 1994); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 175 (1981) (“If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the
other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.”).
57. See, e.g., Quebodeaux v. Quebodeaux, 657 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (describing 
“three elements” necessary to establish duress: “first, one side involuntarily accepted the terms of 
another; second, that circumstances permitted no other alternative; and third, that the opposite party’s
coercive acts caused those circumstances”); Vasapolli, 39 F.3d at 34.
58. “A party’s manifestation of assent is induced by duress if the duress substantially contributes 
to his decision to manifest his assent. . . . The test is subjective and the question is, did the threat actual-
ly induce assent on the part of the person claiming to be the victim of the duress. Threats that would 
suffice to induce assent by one person may not suffice to induce assent by another. All attendant cir-
cumstances must be considered, including such matters as the age, background and relationship of the 
parties. Persons of a weak or cowardly nature are the very ones that need protection; the courageous can 
usually protect themselves. . . . However . . . circumstantial evidence may be useful in determining 
whether a threat did in fact induce assent.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmt. c 
(1981); see also Sudan v. Sudan, 145 S.W.3d 280, 287 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that the test for 
causation is subjective and considers “all surrounding circumstances” including the “background and 
relationship of the parties and the emotional condition of the party claiming duress”).
59. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 239 (1963) (“A charge of economic duress or business compulsion must 
be based on the acts or conduct of the opposite party and not merely on the necessities of the purported 
victim, or on his fear of what a third person might do.”); see also Strickland Tower Maint., Inc. v. 
AT&T Communications, 128 F.3d 1422, 1426 (10th Cir. 1997) (In Oklahoma, “a party seeking to prove 
economic duress must prove that the defendant committed a wrongful act. More importantly, however, 
the plaintiff must also show a causal relationship between the bad act and the contract at issue.”); 
Blodgett v. Blodgett, 441 N.E.2d 1249, 1251-52 (Ohio 1990) (“To avoid a contract on the basis of 
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from cases that voided contracts that were the result of physical compulsion 
or coercion.60 One court noted that the “rationale underlying the principle 
of economic duress is the imposition of certain minimal standards of busi-
ness ethics in the market place.”61 It further noted that these “minimum 
standards” include “equitable notions of fairness and propriety which pre-
clude the wrongful exploitation of business exigencies to obtain dispropor-
tionate exchanges of value which, in turn, undermine the freedom of 
contract and the proper functioning of the system.”62
This article proposes an expansion of the definition of duress to rec-
ognize the unique way in which electronic contracts can be used to force 
terms upon consumers who have no choice but to accept them. This new 
defense of situational duress would render a transaction void, and not mere-
ly voidable. As the Restatement (Second) of Contracts notes, “The distinc-
tion between a ‘void contract’ and a voidable contract has important 
consequences. For example, a victim of duress may be held to have ratified 
the contract if it is voidable, but not if it is ‘void.’”63 Economic duress is a 
voidable transaction rather than a void one; thus, in asserting a claim of 
economic duress, plaintiffs must act promptly or forfeit their claim.64 This 
distinction has particular relevance for electronic contracts because con-
sumers often do not realize they have constructively agreed to the terms of 
the contract.
III. SITUATIONAL DURESS
The recognition of a situational duress defense would be limited to 
situations where consumers are uniquely vulnerable because of the nature 
of their interest in the relevant product or service. In other words, situation-
al duress does not encompass all electronic contracting scenarios. Else-
where, I have argued that the ubiquity of electronic contracts has created a 
coercive contracting environment; however, that environment alone is not 
duress, a party must prove coercion by the other party to the contract. It is not enough to show that one 
assented merely because of difficult circumstances that are not the fault of the other party.”).
60. See PERILLO, supra note 21, at 315-316; see also Strickland Tower Maint., 128 F.3d at 1426 
(“[The] doctrine of economic duress grew from a narrow band of cases that provided relief from con-
tracts secured through actual imprisonment or threats to the reluctant contracting party’s life or limb.”).
61. Centric Corp. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 731 P.2d 411, 413 (Okla. 1986).
62. Id. at 414. The court continued that the doctrine of economic duress “comes into play only 
when conventional alternatives and remedies are unavailable to correct aberrational abuse of these 
norms.” Id.
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 174, cmt. a (1981).
64. See Acquaire v. Can. Dry Bottling, 906 F. Supp. 819, 828 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that a party 
asserting duress must do so “promptly”).
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the trigger for this proposed novel defense of situational duress.65 Rather, 
the defense should be used in the electronic contracting context if (1) a 
drafting company uses an electronic contract to block consumer access to a 
product or service; (2) the consumer has a “vested interest” in that product 
or service; and (3) the consumer accepts the terms because she was blocked 
from the product or service after attempting to reject or decline them. In 
these situations, the consumer’s action should not be effective as a manifes-
tation of assent and the contract should be void.66
A. “Vested interest”
A consumer may have a vested interest in two different scenarios. The 
first is the classic “rolling contract” scenario where the terms of a contract 
arrive after the acts constituting the transaction have been completed.67 The 
company’s introduction of an electronic contract, which prevents access to 
a purchased product, is excessively burdensome. The consumer has a justi-
fiable belief that she can use a product because she has already paid for it 
(or in the case of credit transactions, incurred a binding legal obligation to 
pay for it). She is then made to accept the terms of an electronic contract or
else reject them by physically returning the item in order to get her money 
back (or her account credited). This task is made more difficult if the retail-
er has a restrictive return policy. A consumer may, for example, purchase a 
computer with software preinstalled. When she gets home, she may discov-
er that before she can use the computer she must accept the terms of an 
electronic contract or she must repackage the computer and drive back to 
the store to ask for a refund.
The second scenario involves “content hostage” and occurs when the 
consumer uses a service that, either with or without a fee, permits consum-
ers to store content on the company’s servers. Many online companies not 
only permit but actively encourage consumers to use their services as virtu-
al warehouses. Email providers and social media or “sharing” sites, such as 
Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram fall into this category. In exchange for 
consumers using their services for storage, companies are able to access 
65. I have argued that a coercive contracting environment provides justification for a reconceptu-
alization of unconscionability see KIM, supra note 5, at 203-210. The focus of duress, however, is on 
the improper conduct of one party, unlike unconscionability, which emphasizes the substantive nature 
of the terms. Furthermore, situational duress would render a contract void, as opposed to voidable.
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 (1981) (“If conduct that appears to be a 
manifestation of assent by a party who does not intend to engage in that conduct is physically com-
pelled by duress, the conduct is not effective as a manifestation of assent.”).
67. See Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 744 (2002) (“In a 
rolling contract, a consumer orders and pays for goods before seeing most of the terms, which are 
contained on or in the packaging of the goods.”).
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and use customer information for marketing purposes. Frequent user activi-
ty on a website benefits a company. It can gather more customer data and 
sell more advertising at higher prices.
A user typically registers and agrees to the terms of an electronic con-
tract prior to being permitted to upload content. After registration and when 
the user has already stored content on the website, these companies may 
update their terms and require their users to accept before being allowed to 
continue using the service. Sometimes, these amended terms may be clari-
fications or innocuous adjustments to the service offering. More often, 
however, they reflect changes that tax the user in a more oppressive or 
harmful fashion. For example, Facebook has made several changes to its 
privacy policy that have gradually diminished its users’ privacy.68 In 2005, 
Facebook’s privacy policy stated, “No personal information that you sub-
mit to Thefacebook will be available to any user of the Web Site who does 
not belong to at least one of the groups specified by you in your privacy 
settings.”69
Its latest proposed change (which is being reviewed by the Federal 
Trade Commission70) states,
You give us permission to use your name, profile, picture, content and 
information in connection with commercial, sponsored or related con-
tent . . . . This means, for example, that you permit a business or other 
entity to pay us to display your name and/or profile picture with your 
content or information, without any compensation to you.”71
Google, which has as its unofficial corporate motto “Don’t be evil,” 
recently announced that it, too, would change its terms of use to allow it to 
68. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”), which has documented these changes, states:
Facebook has undergone a remarkable transformation. When it started, it was a private space 
for communication with a group of your choice. Soon, it transformed into a platform where 
much of your information is public by default. Today, it has become a platform where you 
have no choice but to make certain information public, and this public information may be 
shared by Facebook with its partner websites and used to target ads.
See Kurt Opsahl, Facebook’s Eroding Privacy Policy: A Timeline, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION (April 28, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebook-timeline (constructing 
a timeline of Facebook’s privacy policies that show how Facebook has gained more control “of its 
user’s information, while limiting the users’ options to control their own information.”).
69. Id.
70. Vindu Goel & Edward Wyatt, Facebook Privacy Change is Subject of F.T.C. Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/technology/personaltech/ftc-looking-into-
facebook-privacy-policy.html?_r=0.
71. Proposed Statement of Rights and Responsibilities Tracked Changes, Proposed Updates to 
Our Governing Documents, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-site-gover
nance/proposed-updates-to-our-governing-documents/10153167395945301 (PDF may be accessed at 
https://fbcdn-dragon-a.akamaihd.net/hphotos-ak-prn1/851575_209563965879553_209116475_n.pdf) 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
34309-ckt_89-1 Sheet No. 148 Side A      12/16/2013   15:37:13
34309-ckt_89-1 Sheet No. 148 Side A      12/16/2013   15:37:13
09 KIM-HP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/25/2013 8:42 AM
2014] ABERRANCE OF ELECTRONIC CONTRACTS 281
use the names and likenesses of users in paid advertisements across its 
network without seeking their express consent.72
When companies change their terms of use after the user already has 
content stored on the website, it becomes more difficult for users to object 
to revised terms. They may have established large social networks and may 
have invested time and energy cultivating their online presence on the web-
site. Refusal to accept the terms of the electronic agreement means that the 
user will not be able to access her content and would lose the network that 
she has painstakingly developed. Because companies may not give their 
users advance notice of contract changes, the user may have no time to 
save a copy of the stored content or reestablish her network elsewhere, or it 
may be impossible, difficult or impracticable to do so. Even with notice, 
the user already has sunk costs which may make it difficult to find a new 
service, transfer content and contact information, and notify his or her net-
work of the change.73
B. The Improper Threat Posed by Electronic Contracts
An “improper” or “wrongful” act includes illegal acts, but is not lim-
ited to them. Courts emphasize the coercive effect that an act may have on 
the victim’s manifestation of assent. For example, the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma stated, “‘Unlawful’ and/or ‘wrongful’ are not synonymous with 
‘illegal.’”74 The key is that the threatened action presents an unreasonable 
alternative to the weaker party within the confines of a bargaining situation. 
Economic duress may be found if the act is done under circumstances 
which are considered wrongful even if there was a legal right to perform 
the threatened act. The wrongfulness of the coercer’s conduct derives from 
the fact that the threatened party was forced to accept the contract, not from 
any inherent wrongfulness of the act threatened. Thus, a coercer’s threats 
may be wrongful, even though the threatened action would have been legal, 
if the threatened action is an unreasonable alternative to an injurious con-
72. See Terms of Service, GOOGLE (Nov. 11, 2013), 
https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ (“By using our Services, you are agreeing to these 
terms.”). Google does, however, provide a comparison of its previous terms of service. Summary of 
Changes, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/changes/ (last visited Nov. 13, 
2013); see also Claire Cain Miller & Vindu Goel, Google to Sell Users’ Endorsements, N.Y. TIMES
(October 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/12/technology/google-sets-plan-to-sell-users-
endorsements.html?src=xps; Ian Bogost, What is ‘Evil’ to Google?, THEATLANTIC (Oct. 15, 2013, 2:12 
PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/10/what-is-evil-to-google/280573/ (“If 
anything, Google’s motto seems to have largely succeeded at reframing “evil” to exclude all actions 
performed by Google.”).
73. William Barnes et al., Old Habits Die Hard: Path Dependency and Behavioral Lock-in, 38 J.
ECON. ISSUES 371, 373 (2004).
74. Centric Corp. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 731 P.2d 411, 419 (Okla. 1986).
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tractual demand in a bargaining situation. The wrongfulness of the coerc-
er’s conduct is related to the unreasonableness of the alternatives the coerc-
er presents to the weaker party rather than to its legality. As one court 
noted, “‘Unlawful,’ when applied to promises, agreements, contracts, and 
considerations, means that the agreements are legally ineffective because 
they were obtained by bad faith, coercion or compulsion, even though the 
acts may not be illegal per se.”75 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
includes in its definition of improper threats, a threat, which “is a breach of 
the duty of good faith and fair dealing under a contract with the recipi-
ent.”76
In both the rolling contract and content hostage scenarios, the compa-
ny acts improperly or wrongfully by creating a situation that results in an 
unfair choice: contract acceptance or forfeiture. In the “rolling contract” 
situation, the consumer has already purchased the product and the payment 
of money creates an expectation and ownership interest. The company’s act 
of imposing additional terms after purchase is even more unreasonable and 
wrongful when one considers the sheer volume of subsequent terms. A 
study conducted by Professor James Gibson found that buying a computer 
required “agreeing” to an average of 25 binding contracts totaling 74,897 
contractual terms, the majority of which were available only after purchase:
Of the 74,897 total words, only 7,699 (10.3%) were presented to me by 
the time I had to decide whether to order (and pay for) the computer. I 
had to wait until the computer arrived before the rest were made availa-
ble. Of the remaining 67,198 words, 25,912 (34.6%) were presented 
when the computer arrived and was first started up, and the other 41,287 
(55.1%) when individual programs were opened.77
In the “content hostage” situation, the consumer does not pay money 
to the website, but has allowed the site owner to gather data, engaging in an 
implicit or constructive bargain whereby the consumer exchanges infor-
mation for services. The modification after consumer data has been extract-
ed materially changes the terms of the bargain.
By blocking the consumer’s access in each of these two scenarios, the 
company is threatening the consumer with the loss of something in which 
she has a vested property or proprietorship interest. The company’s threat 
is improper in the rolling contract scenario because it asks for terms to 
govern the transaction even though the transaction has been completed. It 
withholds something from the consumer that already belongs to the con-
sumer. In the content hostage scenario, the company has encouraged the 
75. Id.
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 176.
77. Gibson, supra note 48, at 192-93.
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consumer’s reliance upon the company’s services and has already received 
the benefits in the form of access to the consumer’s contacts and personal 
information. It then places the user in the situation where she has no choice 
but to accept the new or additional terms or forfeit her content and contacts. 
In both scenarios, the electronic contract acts like a lock, keeping the con-
sumer away from something she has already paid for, either in dollars or 
information. The introduction of an electronic contract at this point creates 
an improper threat in the sense that the company forces the consumer to 
accept or risk forfeiture of valuable goods or services.
C. No Reasonable Alternative
Courts have ruled that a rolling contract is an enforceable contracting 
method if the consumer is provided an opportunity to reject terms.78 A
consumer can reject a rolling contract by packing up and returning the 
product. This rejection option is impractical especially where electronic 
contracts are involved. The consumer does not encounter electronic con-
tracts until after she or he has unpackaged the product and tried to use it. 
The introduction of terms at this late stage of the package unbundling pro-
cess means that a retailer is far less likely to accept return of the goods. 
Best Buy, for example, a large retailer of electronic goods, does not provide 
refunds for returns of “opened computer software,” but permits only ex-
changes.79 Staples, a large retailer of office supplies, has a similar policy 
that allows refunds only for returns of “unopened boxed software” but 
“opened software can only be exchanged for the same title version” and 
“(d)ownloadable software is not returnable or refundable.”80 Furthermore, 
electronic contracts often appear on devices after the consumer has had the 
product for a period of time. This makes it much more difficult for the user 
to return the device, both because the consumer has grown dependent upon 
it and because the manufacturer is unlikely to provide a refund for the 
product’s return.81
In order to avail herself of a situational duress defense, the consumer 
must testify that she attempted to decline or reject terms but was forced to 
78. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996); Hill v. Gateway 2000, 
Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that ProCD “holds that terms inside a box of software 
bind consumers who use the software after an opportunity to read the terms and to reject them by 
returning the product”).
79. See Return & Exchange Policy, BEST BUY (Oct. 20, 2013), http://www.bestbuy.com/site/Help-
Topics/Returning-Online-Purchases/pcmcat260800050014.c?id=pcmcat260800050014.
80. Help Center, Shipping & Delivery, STAPLES, http://www.staples.com/sbd/cre/programs/cust
omerservice/shipping_and_returns.html#returns_exchanges (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
81. For example, the author periodically receives clickwraps that appear on her iPad even now, 
two years after her initial purchase of the device.
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accept them. A user attempts to reject an electronic contract by clicking on 
a “decline” icon. If she is then prevented from proceeding, her subsequent 
acceptance was coerced.
A “reject first” requirement serves two purposes. The first purpose is 
to raise consumer awareness and to reduce consumer habituation of online 
terms. Consumers have grown accustomed to clicking “agree” automatical-
ly because they know it makes no difference if they read the terms—they 
must accept them if they wish to proceed on the website. Their assent is 
preordained by the coercive contracting environment so they proceed 
through the contracting process as quickly as they can. If consumers realize 
that they may be saved from a contract by clicking “decline” first, even if 
they have to then click “accept” in order to proceed, they may overcome 
their learned helplessness in the face of adhesive contracts. Clicking “de-
cline” enables consumers to declare their choice, even if they are unable to 
exercise it.
The second reason for a “reject first” requirement is that it provides a 
powerful incentive for companies to offer better ways to reject terms. In 
order to rebut a plaintiff’s testimony that she tried to reject terms, a compa-
ny must prove that she did not attempt to decline terms.82 Currently, com-
panies neither track nor maintain records of which users accept or decline 
terms. Providing them with an incentive to do so may motivate companies 
to seek assent or rejection in ways that both facilitate recordkeeping and 
heighten user awareness of the contract, such as email consent. Further-
more, increasing the burden on companies to record which users decline 
modified terms may discourage companies from making changes too fre-
quently or unnecessarily.
D. The Limited Applicability of Situational Duress
There are several traditional reasons for limiting duress claims. One is 
that parties to an arm’s length negotiation should be able to bargain in their 
own interests. Courts have generally rejected claims of duress where the 
party seeking to escape the contract entered into the transaction with a prof-
it motive, but had then been subjected to hard bargaining.83 Consistent with 
82. Browsewraps typically are not used to block access to a website but if they were used in this 
way, the user would be presumed to have bypassed the hyperlink without clicking unless the company 
can prove otherwise.
83. See Pleasants v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 569 P.2d 261, 263 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (“If 
the payment or exchange is made with the hope of obtaining a gain, there is not duress; it must be made 
solely for the purpose of protecting the victim’s business or property interests.”); Acquaire v. Can. Dry 
Bottling, 906 F. Supp. 819, 827-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that contract made for personal gain under-
cut duress claim).
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that line of cases, situational duress would only be applicable if the con-
sumer was not motivated by profit or gain to enter into the contract. To the 
contrary, the consumer in the two specified scenarios does not want to enter 
into any contract at all. Rather, the company is forcing the consumer into 
the contract and the consumer acquiesces in order to avoid forfeiture of a 
vested interest.
Another objection is that allowing parties to escape contracts too easi-
ly would undermine the security of transactions. In the rolling contract 
scenario, the company unilaterally imposes terms after the acts constituting 
the transaction have been completed. In the content hostage scenario, the 
drafter unilaterally changes the terms of the initial registration agreement. 
The blame for any destabilizing effect in both scenarios can be assigned to 
the company seeking to add or modify terms to either a completed transac-
tion or an existing contract. In other words, the company is engaging in 
conduct analogous to a “bait and switch.” The company lures the consumer 
into purchasing a product or relying upon the company’s service, and then 
unilaterally imposes additional or different terms after the consumer has 
grown dependent upon it.84 The company is essentially playing a “hold-up” 
game where it uses electronic contracts to block access to a product or ser-
vice until the user acquiesces to the terms.85
A successful claim of situational duress does not mean that no terms 
govern the relationship between the parties. In the content hostage situa-
tion, the terms of the original contract govern. In the rolling contract situa-
tion, the company can insert limitations of liability and warranty 
disclaimers into packaging under the Uniform Commercial Code provided 
they meet certain conspicuousness requirements.86 The possibility of a 
successful situational duress claim may discourage the deceptive business 
practice of a company luring a customer with a product or service and then 
changing the terms so the “bargain” is materially different from what was 
originally promised. Instead of the unrestrained power to unilaterally im-
pose terms, businesses will have to think of more appropriate ways to en-
tice consumers to accept modified terms. For example, a company might 
offer support services or bonus add-ons if a product has already been pur-
84. See supra Part III.A.
85. In a famous case, after reaching a remote location, the crew of a fishing vessel refused to work 
unless the owner of the vessel agreed to pay double agreed wages. Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico, 
117 F. 99, 1010 (9th Cir. 1902). The court held that the owner’s promise to pay double wages was 
obtained under duress and therefore unenforceable. Id. at 102-03.
86. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2012). In order to exclude or modify the implied warranty of mer-
chantability, the “language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, 
and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and con-
spicuous.” Id.
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chased. In the content hostage scenario, the company can offer “new and 
improved” services to those who accept new terms while continuing to 
offer existing services to those who decline terms.
In the alternative, to defend against a situational duress claim and still 
implement new terms, a company could offer a rescission remedy. This 
“reasonable alternative” to accepting the terms of the modified agreement 
would allow the parties to rescind the initial contract between the parties 
and, to the extent possible, undo the transaction. In the rolling contract 
scenario, the company would have to pick up and pay for shipping and 
handling of the product, and provide a full refund. In the content hostage 
scenario, the company must provide a convenient way for users to easily 
export all of their personal information and data during a reasonable “phase
out” period. In addition, the company must cease using any user infor-
mation for marketing purposes, expunge any information received from the 
user (including information about the user’s contacts), and terminate any 
licenses that have been granted by the user. It must also notify any third 
parties, including marketing companies, and terminate any licenses granted 
to them involving the information.
CONCLUSION
Electronic contracts differ from paper contracts and courts recognized 
them in order to facilitate commercial transactions and encourage market-
place innovations, such as mass-market digital products. Courts have em-
phasized the similarities between these electronic forms and their physical 
counterparts, but have often ignored their differences. Companies take 
advantage of the flexible form and low cost of electronic contracts and 
modify them liberally. Electronic contracts can be used as a barrier to a 
transaction or interaction, preventing a consumer from continuing to use a 
product, proceeding on a website or progressing with an installation. This 
leaves a consumer particularly vulnerable because that consumer already 
has a vested right or interest in the use of that product or service. A con-
sumer who has posted years of content on a particular website may be 
locked out without warning by an electronic agreement that requires ac-
ceptance. Fear of losing her content may compel her to agree to the terms.
Contract law must address the adverse impact of electronic contracts 
on consumer perceptions, choice, expectations and intent. This article rec-
ognizes situational factors unique to the electronic contracting environment 
and proposes an expanded definition of duress as one way to respond to the 
aberrance of electronic contracts. Expanding the definition of duress to 
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include situational duress is only one way in which contract law might 
respond to the aberrant nature of electronic contracts.
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